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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

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In the matter of:

Reserve Oil & Gas, Inc., a Nevada

Corporation
3507 North Central Avenue, Suite 503
Phoenix, Arizona 85012

Allen and Jane Doe Stout, Sr. husband and wife

COMMISSIONERS

JEFF HATCH-MILLER, Chairman

WILLIAM A. MUNDELL

MIKE GLEASON

KRISTIN K. MAYES

BARRY WONG

1309 West Portland Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2102

Allen and Jane Doe Stout, Jr., husband and wife 1309 West Portland Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2102

Respondents.

Arizona Corporation Commission

DOCKETED

DEC 272006

DOCKETED BY

Docket No. S-20437A-05-0925

THE SECURITIES DIVISION'S REPLY TO:

RESONDENT ALLEN C. STOUT'S RESPONSE TO THE SECURITIES DIVISION'S MOTION TO DEPOSE ALLEN C. STOUT AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

RECEIVED

1006 DEC 27 P 4: 38

AZ CORP COMMISSION
DOCUMENT CONTROL

The Securities Division ("Division") of the Arizona Corporation Commission hereby replies to Respondent Allen C. Stout's Response to the Securities Division's Motion to Depose Allen C. Stout and Motion for Protective Order ("Response"). The Division requests the court order the deposition of Allen C. Stout ("Stout Sr."), or alternatively that the court order Stout Sr. to appear to testify at any hearing scheduled in the future. The Division also asks Respondent's Motion for a protective order be denied. In support of its requests, the Division files the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. Undisputed Facts

Stout Sr. clearly was absent from the scheduled hearing. The Division was unaware Stout Sr. would be absent from the hearing until that day. Additionally, there is no dispute that Stout Sr. filed a response to these proceedings, that he requested a hearing, and that he is subject to the jurisdiction of this tribunal.

II. Law

The Arizona administrative code gives this court the authority to order the deposition of Stout Sr. See A.R.S. § 41-1062(A)(4). The statute provides that if the witness cannot be subpoenaed or is unable to attend, the hearing officer may permit a deposition for use as evidence. The hearing officer may also permit a discovery deposition if a party demonstrates a reasonable need of the deposition testimony. Id. The granting of a deposition is clearly is within the hearing officer's discretion, and it is not a right. However, in this case the Division believes that the hearing officer should exercise its discretion and grant the deposition

III. Analysis

The first basis for granting a deposition is one in which there is need for testimony and the witness cannot be subpoenaed *or* is unable to attend. This court may order Stout Sr. to appear to testify at the hearing as he is within this court's jurisdiction. Alternatively, if Stout Sr. is unavailable to attend, the court can order his deposition for use as evidence at the hearing. Based upon Stout's Sr.'s absence at the hearing and there being no representation affirmatively setting forth that he will attend any future hearing, this court may assume he cannot attend and order his deposition for evidence at the hearing.

The court may also order the deposition because the Division has shown reasonable need for the testimony. As explained in the Division's motion, a deposition may provide testimony concerning the allegations, or if the witness asserts the privilege against self-incrimination at the deposition, a prejudicial inference may be drawn from the response. *See, Fross v. Wotton*, 3 Cal.

2d 384, 44 P.2d 350 (1935).

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For these reasons, the Division respectfully requests its motion be granted or alternatively that Stout Sr. be ordered to attend to testify at any hearing scheduled in the future.

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IV. The Division's Response to Respondent's Motion for a Protective Order

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A. No Facts Support a Request for a Protective Order

There are no facts that support the conclusion assumed by Respondent that the deposition sought of Stout, Sr. is to cause "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." According to Respondent's Response, the request resulted from the ruling to continue the case. While the Division's request came after the ruling, it also came after it was clear that Respondent Stout Sr. did not attend the hearing and would apparently not be attending any hearing. Even if the request resulted from the continuance, it is unclear how the request is made to annoy, embarrass or oppress the Respondent. The Division simply wants to proceed with its case with the testimony of Stout Sr., either in person or through deposition testimony. There is no evidence of any bad motive in making this request and injecting this baseless allegation into the equation does not respond to the law that has been cited in favor of the deposition.

В. No Legal Basis is Cited in Support of the Request for a Protective Order

The Respondent cites three cases, which have been attached for the judge's review. Not one of these cases factually or legally supports the Respondent's position. In State ex. Rel. Chaney v. Franklin, 941 S.W.2d 790 (1997), a Missouri prosecutor sought to depose the public defender of a witness in a criminal proceeding. The case does not stand for the proposition that the Administrative law Judge has the authority to issue a protective order as stated by Respondent. In the case of Crandall v. Ford Motor Co., 260 A.D. 380 (1940), a court limited the questioning at a deposition because there was a bifurcation between liability and damages in a civil proceeding – not an administrative case. The court permitted a deposition but required that liability be found before questioning into damages would proceed. Although undersigned counsel would concede that depositions are not to be used to harass opponents, the Crandall case

cited for this proposition has no resemblance factually or legally to the one before this court.

There simply is no evidence to support Respondent's request for a protective order.

Finally, Respondent cites a Supreme Court of Louisiana case - *MTU of North America*, *Inc. v. Raven Marine, Inc.*, 475 So.2d 1063 for the proposition that depositions are to be used to gain information and prevent surprise at trial and not to harass opponents. Interestingly, in *MTU* the court did not grant a protective order and said specifically, in interpreting a Louisiana statute, that good cause had to be shown for a protective order and placed the burden on the party requesting the relief to show adequate reason for the relief. *Id.* at 1069. Here Respondent has not cited any applicable rule or statute for the protective order it requests, nor does he cite any factual basis for such relief. Instead, Respondent rests his request on conclusory statements. Wherefore Respondent's request for a protective order must be denied.

IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Stout Sr. filed a response to these proceedings, requested a hearing before this tribunal, and has submitted to the jurisdiction of this court. Stout Sr. cannot participate in this forum without subjecting himself to being subpoenaed for testimony. This court should either require Stout Sr. to appear at any hearing it schedules or provide the Division with a deposition for his testimony. Further, Respondent has not provided any factual or legal basis for his request for a protective order. His attempts to impute some improper reason for the Division's request is misplaced, this matter should be decided upon the law and not invective.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27 day of December, 2006.

By

Shoshana O. Epstein

Staff Attorney, Arizona Corporation Commission - Securities Division

| 1 | ORIGINAL AND THIRTEEN (13) COPIES of the foregoing |
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| 2 | filed this 27th day of December, 2006, with |
| 3 | Docket Control Arizona Corporation Commission |
| 4 | 1200 West Washington |
| 5 | Phoenix, AZ 85007 |
| 6 | COPY of the foregoing hand-delivered along with copies of The cases cited by Respondents this |
| 7 | 2711 day of December, 2006, to: |
| 8 | ALJ Marc Stern Arizona Corporation Commission/Hearing Division |
| 9 | 1200 West Washington |
| 10 | Phoenix, AZ 85007 |
| 11 | this 274 day of December, 2006 to: |
| 12 | Paul J. Roshka, Jr., Esq. |
| 13 | ROSHKA, DEWULF & PATTEN, P.L.C. 400 East Van Buren Street, Suite 800 |
| 14 | Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Attorneys for Respondents |
| 15 | By: Veronica Salora |
| 16 | Dy. Ivines Inform |
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